Among the characteristic features of depression is a diminishment in or lack of action and motivation. In this paper, I consider a dominant philosophical account which purports to explain
Introduction
A striking aspect of depression is a marked diminishment in or lack of action and motivation.
Amongst many other things, depression is a vivid case of agency-or action-undermining mental illness and characteristically involves a discord between a person"s judgements, beliefs and utterances and what they do or fail to do. For instance, despite what a depressed person believes, understands and says about what they ought to do, they do not act in ways that accord with what they believe, understand and say. In this paper I consider a dominant philosophical account which purports to explain what is happening in cases such as these. This account emphasizes how a depressed person"s "belief-desire" profile undergoes changes such that the relevantly motivational propositional attitudes -desires -have dropped away. This is held to explain the lack or absence of motivation in depression. I also consider a modified version of this view, one which explains the lack of motivation not in terms of the diminishment of desires but of the "interference" caused by a person"s having a particular set of beliefs. These are beliefs that block or undermine motivation in virtue of their content.
The dominant view and its modified version have important differences although they both prioritize a depressed person"s mental states in explaining motivational pathology. No-one ought to deny that mental states or psychological considerations are important in this context.
But what should not be neglected is that a central feature of depression is also changes to a person"s bodily feelings and capacities. In this paper I suggest that these changes are constitutively related to changes in motivation. Broadly stated, I propose an account according Penultimate draft 2 to which the lack or absence of motivation in depression can be understood as changes to our bodily attitudes rather than exclusively in terms of changes to our propositional attitudes. I argue that the character of our bodily nature and not (or not just) our psychology is a basic feature of our agential capacities. I suggest that the absence or lack of motivation and action experienced as part of depression can be understood by attending to changes in how our bodies articulate and respond to meaningful features in the environment. These features incorporate aspects of the world which motivate us to act or, as is often the case in depression, may fail to do so.
Depression and loss of desire
There are assumptions about agency and motivation that encourage employing the language of "alienation" or "estrangement" to describe cases in which the broad relation of someone"s thoughts to their actions is broken down (Hornsby, 2004) . Cases include those in which a person knows and understands, say, that φ-ing is what is required or called for, but they do not or cannot φ, or cases in which a person experiences a compulsion that makes them act or fail to act despite their will or intentions. In such examples a person is said to be alienated from their agency in the sense that the relevant action or omission does not count as a case of authentic agency or "human action par excellence", as Velleman puts it (Velleman 1992, 462) . 1 Providing an account of what this alienation amounts to is complex and controversial but it does seem to be a broad feature of our lives that there is sometimes a mismatch between what a person purports to know or think and what they then do or fail to do. We sometimes explain such cases by saying that a person has a "weak will": S knows that eating a lot of chips is unhealthy although S"s desire for chips typically outweighs this knowledge and, despite what S knows, S eats a lot of chips. Other times we might explain similar phenomena by citing other characteristics such as obsessions, addiction, or forms of neurosis.
2 From one perspective depression involves some form of alienation since a depressed person understands that they ought to act in such and such a way but does not. We might suppose that a depressed person is not adequately motivated and thus they are prevented from enjoying authentic agency. For instance, it may be that a person has an overwhelming sense of worthlessness that impedes their acting in accord with a relevant judgement -perhaps the sort of "feelings of worthlessness" referred to in the diagnostic criteria for a major depressive episode for instance (American Psychiatric Association 2000, 356) . More broadly we can appeal to philosophical accounts of 1 See Hornsby (2004) , for example, for a critical discussion of Velleman"s account the "problem of agency" as described in Velleman (1992) . 2 For discussion of related issues see Nordenfelt (2007) .
Penultimate draft 3 motivation in order to illuminate the nature of motivational pathology as experienced in depression. I will consider the standard account first.
What I take to be the standard and broadly Humean model of motivation appears to provide an account of why a depressed person is not motivated and thus why they do not act.
Central to the standard account of motivation is belief-desire psychology. On one reading the model implies that the absence of action results from an absence of "desire", a cardinal mental state that is principally responsible for motivation and thus, ideally, action. More specifically what explains the lack of action is the lack of motivation and, in turn, what explains the lack of motivation is the lack of desire. What is significant about this model is the rationale for explaining some supposedly objective event or state of affairs (lack of action) by citing the absence of or changes to some inner state or states; principally desire since, according to the standard view, no other psychological state has the right kind of essential connection to a human will.
On the standard view, in order to act or be motivated a person needs to possess relevant beliefs and desires the combination of which provide motivation. Desires present an agent with a goal and beliefs provide information about how to achieve it. In order to be motivated to act, a person needs to have both a relevant world-guided mental representation, a belief, and also a desire. For example, a person will be motivated to act in a particular way, eating some chips, say, if she has a desire to eat chips and a belief that there are some chips on the table. Thus, belief-desire psychology has an account of motivation that refers to two kinds of propositional attitude which cooperate to give rise to someone"s being motivated and, if all goes well, their acting in the world and achieving their practical goals.
This framework has an important implication for accounting for the experience of depression. The Humean view holds that in cases of depression the relevant changes to a person"s psychological profile do not affect beliefs. We are told that it is "manifestly true" that depression undermines motivation but does so in a way that can leave a person"s capacity to possess and acquire beliefs unaffected (Smith 1994, 61) . Given the assumed primacy of desire as the principal source of motivation, the standard view thus implies that a depressed person does not or need not experience any changes to their beliefs. For example, consider Mele"s example of a person suffering from clinical depression:
Seemingly, we can imagine that she retains certain of her beliefs about what she is morally required to do [but she is] utterly devoid of motivation to act accordingly. She has aided her ailing uncle for years, believing herself to be morally required to do so.
Perhaps she continues to believe this, but now is utterly unmotivated to assist him (Mele 1996, 733) .
So a depressed person can continue to possess beliefs understood as, say, truth-apt propositional attitudes and perhaps also to demonstrate sensitivity to the inferential relations between them.
Any relevant changes to a person"s mental states and capacities take place at the independent level of desire. This idea rests on a fundamental aspect of Humean psychology: the claim that beliefs and desires are "distinct existences" (e.g., Smith 1994, 7) . This is important since the standard view can appeal to the distinctness of belief from desire to account for the lack of motivation and action in depression. There is an apparently straightforward account that can cite changes in a person"s set of desires at the same time as denying that there need be any changes in the set of beliefs. However, there are a number of reasons to reject this picture, some of which are provided by reflection on our experience.
Depression and mental interference
In the context of depression Iain Law considers a Humean approach according to which one"s belief profile remains unchanged whilst the independent motivating element has dropped away.
However, as he writes:
My own experience of depression is not like this at all. In depression, everyday tasks take on an aspect of impossibility. I do not see, say, replying to an email, as an easy task that I am peculiarly lacking in motivation to perform. Rather, I see it as far more difficult that it actually is, or I see myself as not being up to the task ... in my case desire has not come apart from belief (Law 2009, 354) .
This emphasizes how the way in which objects are perceived is changed. An "aspect of impossibility" becomes part of the content of what is seen or considered. In such cases the extent to which one is motivated is not something that can be isolated from one"s beliefs.
Usually, one does not regard tasks such as replying to an email in some neutral way, and then also have some desire or favouring stance which is then adopted such that one is thereby moved to reply to an email. This is not obviously how things are in usual cases and it is not how things are in cases of motivational or behavioural pathology. The relevant task is regarded, considered or perceived as challenging or perhaps as something impossibly difficult. The experience of depression involves changes to how the world is perceived and what the world offers a person by way of opportunities for action.
There are two related ways in which a person"s perception changes in this respect. On the one hand, descriptions of the experience of depression include how everyday objects and contexts are seen as different to how they would otherwise appear. For instance, to a depressed person going to a coffee shop might no longer appear as an opportunity to relax and meet (Law 2009, 358) .
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Suppose that in seeing someone at a party who is shy and awkward a person is thereby drawn to go and talk to them. 4 In depression, a person may see the shyness and awkwardness but also have other beliefs and emotions that block the relevant actions coming to fruition, so to speak.
Law suggests that the failure to act need not be because a depressed person does not perceive the same things as other people, but because of "additional thoughts or background beliefs that get in the way" (Law 2009, 358 4 The example is Law"s (2009, 352) .
5 Empirical research on "learned helplessness" by Seligman and colleagues purports to show that people with depression have a tendency to adopt a "pessimistic explanatory style" when characterizing events (e.g., Abramson and Seligman 1978; Seligman et al 1988) , and they suggest that "undoing" this style "may be a curative element in the cognitive therapy of depression" (Seligman et al 1988, 17) . Law draws on the cognitive account of depression as advanced by Beck (e.g., Beck et al, 1979) to show that "cognitive restructuring" can have important therapeutic effects for people with depression. 
A Dilemma?
John Roberts has argued, like Law, that the standard view fails to provide a persuasive account of the experience of depression (Roberts, 2001) . The idea that depression does not affect person"s beliefs but removes motivation by eroding non-cognitive propositional attitudes is not convincing. But in elaborating the failure of the standard view Roberts focuses on different aspects. Roberts defends this claim by explaining how depression "leaves one"s evaluative outlook intact" (Roberts 2001, 43) . 7 Having an evaluative outlook implies possessing values which are conceptually connected to adopting "favourable attitudes" (Roberts 2001, 44 why it is that a depressed person does not act. Since desires and beliefs are present in episodes of depression, the question as to why it is that a depressed person does not act or reports loss of motivation remains simply unanswered on the Humean account.
Roberts considers a non-Humean alternative according to which our mental economy, alongside beliefs and desires as distinct propositional attitudes, includes a different kind of composite mental state. This state incorporates the motivational role conventionally assigned to desires into a certain class of belief: so-called "normative beliefs" (Roberts 2001, 44) . These would be, for example, beliefs about what one ought to. Believing that one ought to φ is constitutively apt to motivate an agent who has that belief. Such beliefs, without the need of a distinct desire, are sufficient to produce motivation and action (Roberts, 2001: 45) . The alternative non-Humean view considered by Roberts blends together cognition and affect such that there is a kind of belief that is intrinsically motivating and which thus needs no supplement by way of a non-cognitive or affective mental state. 9 But this poses a problem of its own, since people with depression often or even typically retain normative beliefs or beliefs about what they ought to do. Although the "output" of such motivating beliefs is blocked or defeated such that a person with depression does not act, the continuing presence of such beliefs (in part)
explains the feelings of guilt that are often reported in the experience of depression; a depressed person does not do what they believe they ought to do (Roberts 2001, 47; see also Ratcliffe 7 See also Smith (1994, 120-121) . 8 In the context Roberts draws on David Lewis (1989) to help show that values cannot merely be beliefs.
9 This characterization of moral judgement is thus a form of "internalism" with regard to motivation. For a helpful recent attempt to assess the credentials of motivational internalism with regard to depression see Cholbi (2011) . We can follow the Humean and be in a position to explain why depressives are not motivated to act. But this comes at the cost of not being able to explain the continued presence of their values. On the other hand, we can follow the non-Humean and be able to explain the depressives" continued identification with their values, but only at the cost of not being able to explain their lack of action ... Neither view ... appears to be able to accommodate the facts about depressive behavioural pathology, and so neither can be considered adequate (Roberts 2001, 45-46 ).
Roberts suggests a way out of the dilemma by proposing modifications to the Humean view, but I will not consider those here. I have sketched the problem Roberts highlights in order to emphasize what I take to be a common factor shared by both elements in the dilemma: the tacit commitment to a mentalistic characterization of motivation in depression.
What drives the dilemma is the inability to explain lack of motivation on either a Humean or non-Humean view. The view considered in the previous section according to which motivation can be "blocked" by other beliefs is a version of a "non-Humean" view and, on the face of it, it may seem to offer a way through the dilemma. Law"s suggestion does seem at least to offer an explanation of how it can be that desires are present yet a depressed person is not motivated: they have other thoughts and beliefs that block motivation. My point is that explaining lack of motivation in this way is still overly psychological. Both sides of Roberts"s dilemma, and Law"s specific non-Humean proposal, involve characterizing the relevant motivational pathology in terms of mental states. These accounts thus adopt a broad psychological approach. They emphasize the presence/absence of desires, or a special kind of belief-desire alloy or some hybrid state that unites the affective and the cognitive components of what would otherwise be distinct propositional attitudes, or cite the presence of particular beliefs that block the motivating power of other beliefs. The way the experience of depression is portrayed and the approaches to motivation so far considered are driven by a pervasive assumption that the explanandum -motivational pathology -and the explanans can be adequately described in psychological terms. The origins of this pervasive assumption are in its metaphysical underpinnings. Once these are dislodged it makes possible a different approach to motivation and one that can afford a more compelling account of the experience of depression. Humean metaphysics implies that even though our experience purports to be genuinely responsive to the nature of the world, in many cases it is not. Part of our experience, for instance, seems to be of an independent and value-laden world and Hume tried to make sense of this without appealing to properties or states of affairs that would contravene a naturalistic world view. He supposed that, on reflection, our evaluative experience cannot really be what it seems to be -it cannot be that there really is an external world which contains evaluative properties to which we respond. Hume accounted for the phenomenology by citing a "productive faculty" of our minds (Hume 1975, 294) . For example, he thought that values are "projected" in such a way as to make it seem as though they are genuinely part of the world, and that we are genuinely responsive to some independently constituted evaluative reality which motivates us to think and act in various ways. When projecting in this way we "gild and stain" the natural world "with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment" (Hume 1975, 294) . In the context of explaining the lack or absence of motivation in depression Humean projectivism is, along with the belief-desire psychology, a function of metaphysical commitments.
Metaphysics and Projection
Once we have embraced the idea that the world we confront, the world we find ourselves in, is in itself simply bereft of meaning and without intrinsic motivational potency, our psychological activity takes on a considerable explanatory burden. In Hume"s case our psychological operations are notoriously far-reaching since they are responsible even for our basic beliefs about causal relations that we take to hold between events in the world. We mistakenly think that our ideas of causal relations are the product of experience when in fact they are the product of the mind"s tendency to "spread itself on external objects" (Hume 1978, 167 ); Hume is a projectivist about causation as well as about values (Stroud 1993; Beebee 2007 Humean naturalism denies that the world can contain properties and states of affairs that are intrinsically motivating; that is, intrinsically such that to experience or be acquainted with these properties or states of affairs is thereby to be moved to pursue them. If there were such inherently motivating properties or states of affairs then they would have, in one famous way of putting it, "to-be-pursuedness" somehow built into them (Mackie 1977, 40) . Like Hume,
Mackie rejected any appeal to the allegedly mysterious idea that something could be genuinely part of the world and, because of its constitution, could also motivate simply by being noticed by someone, or at least by someone who is not depressed. In other words motivation cannot be a matter of picking up on saliences that are partly constitutive of the external world but is instead generated wholly from within subjectivity or, more precisely, from within our mental lives. As I have emphasized, this kind of metaphysical picture lends plausibility to the idea that behavioural or motivational pathologies can be accounted for by the absence or dysfunction of mental states. Overall, Humean psychology and its metaphysical foundations support the view that human beings are motivated by acquiring the appropriate type of psychological states. This view has thus been interpreted as form of "subjectivism" although there is considerable disagreement as to what this amounts to (e.g., Mackie 1977, 17-18; Wiggins 1998 ).
Subjectivism about values and motivation need not be simply a thesis about our "inner lives" cut off from the outer external world. In fact depression might provide a case which directly challenges the idea that the character of motivation can be made intelligible without taking account of the nature of the perceived world. perceived" (Church 2009, 175) . This "correspondence" is a way of expressing the idea that there is an essential relation between felt experience and the objects of experience -broadly speaking, between self and world. Consider these first-person descriptions from people who received a diagnosis of depression, and were writing in response to the question "Does the world look different when you"re depressed?": People with depression often describe how the world looks thin, dry, mean and greycorresponding to the ways in which a person feels about the world. This correspondence, as
Church points out, can be interpreted in a number of ways. One way is that the correspondence is the function of a person caring less about the world; depression results in noticing less of the world because a person is caring less about it. But this would not take account of how, in depression, the objects of attention are often described as changed as are the wider structural features of experience.
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For instance, depressed people describe how everyday situations, objects and opportunities are experienced in ways quite different from how they ordinarily are. Seeing the laptop over there might usually elicit a range of habitual actions; opening some email messages and replying to them, checking the opening times of shops, and so on. For a depressed person seeing the laptop might give rise to an explicit and distressing sense of alienation from these everyday activities; the opportunities that would otherwise be presented become closed-off or perhaps seen as impossibly difficult. As one autobiographical account of depression describes:
The objects in a room have a stronger will than your own [. To feel depressed is (in part) to perceive the world as mean and gray." (Graham 2010, 11 Changes to temporal experience are often reported in depression, sometimes in quite radical ways. As Andrew Solomon writes: "When you are depressed, the past and the future are absorbed entirely by the present moment, as in the world of a three-year-old ... Being upset, even profoundly upset, is a temporal experience, while depression is a-temporal." (Solomon 2001, 55) . See Fuchs (2001; 2005b; and Ratcliffe (forthcoming).
Penultimate draft 12 33). 12 This suggests a different approach to a purely psychological model by drawing together the corresponding role of "internal" feelings and "external" aspects of the world. Nevertheless, it may still be possible to account for the changes in experience as arising from correlative changes to what is projected; that is, changes to our "internal sentiments". If the "colours borrowed from internal sentiment" are mean, grey and flat, then it would not be surprising that the world seems mean, grey and flat; if that is how we gild and stain it then that is how it is bound to look. But projectivism fails to take account of what "correspondence" can mean in this context.
The correspondence between what is perceived and what is felt can be characterized as an interdependence between the normative features of the world and our sentiments. Generally speaking, neo-Humeans emphasize how the evaluative features of the world are the "children" of our sentiments in contrast to anti-Humeans who regard the relevant aspects of the world as the "parents" of our sentiments (Blackburn 1981, 165 ). But there is a different "no-priority" view which regards the relation between our sentiments and the features of the world to which they respond as more like that between "siblings" (McDowell, 1998a 159 On a broadly Humean view, our conative attitudes constitute the primary motivational force for action and are among the things that we project out on to a supposedly blank and neutral external world. In contrast to this, we can understand such attitudes as not just responses to a pre-given and indifferent world but as partly constitutive of our experience in the first place.
Daniel Jacobsen describes the kind of affective perception made possible by some form of no-12 A notable theme in the questionnaire responses (see n.10) as in other accounts of depression is how people describe the world as looking "grey" (or "dark" or "black") and use numerous other references to colour. Recent empirical research has suggested that such descriptions may have a physiological basis since studies on retinal response purport to show a "reduced sensitivity of subjective contrast perception in depressed patients" and thus how "depression can be measured in the eye of the diseased". See Bubl et al (2010) . (McNaughton 1988, 113) . According to this model, a motivational element is partly constitutive of our experience of the world not supplied by some independent and isolable inner mental state such as a "desire". In short, we can be motivated directly by the world which we experience and, in seeking to identify or assess a motivational element we do not need just to consult our inner mental lives. Some philosophers have developed this idea and suggested that the source of motivation is properly thought of as located in the world and not produced or generated by internal states. For instance, according to Jonathan Dancy we should say that what motivates us is "not a state of ourselves at all, but rather the nature of the situation"; we thus need "to look through the believings to the things believed if we are to find the real source of motivation" (Dancy 2000, 77) . For instance, the fact that the person needs help is what motivates my helping, not that I am motivated because I believe that the person needs help. Likewise, apparent lack or deficiencies in motivation can at least partly be accounted for in terms of the things believed or desired -that is, in terms of features of the world. This suggests a different sort of account about the source and nature of motivation and an alternative characterization of the place of motivation in the experience of depression.
Recall that the accounts thus far considered have, to different degrees, proposed that we understand motivation and its pathologies in terms of the nature and role of relevant mental states. The metaphysical underpinning to the psychological approach contrasts with what is presented by the cluster of views just outlined: the idea that affect is not as such independent from our experience of the world and that the source of motivation need not be thought of as exclusively internal to our mental lives. The view I will consider presently holds that the nature of a situation and its role in motivation is configured through the character of our bodily existence, and thus it presents a positive account of what a non-psychological approach to motivation consists in.
Motivation and the Body
The contrast between psychological accounts and body-oriented characterizations of motivation needs to be drawn carefully. It can seem not obviously correct that emphasizing bodily aspects implies denying a fundamental role for mental states. For instance, the broadly Humean view from which psychological approaches draw much of their inspiration is avowedly naturalistic; it is a commitment to the supremacy of a naturalistic world-view that explains the subsequent projectivist accounts of features that have apparent -but ultimately unreal -intrinsic motivating force. In addition, this naturalism could not only concede but positively embrace the idea that depression has symptoms and components that are "bodily". Humean psychology is rooted in
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14 naturalist metaphysics which is set against the idea that there is a sui generis realm of the mental entirely closed off from empirical investigation. So a psychological approach could, so the suggestion goes, directly support the idea that the body is of fundamental importance. It could do this, for example, by advancing a thesis according to which mental states as such as beliefs and desires supervene on brain states. The subvenient base is physiological, it is bodily, and thus there is no principled reason why a defender of the psychological approach needs to deny that the body is central in any plausible account of motivation and its pathologies; a supervenience thesis accounts for the continuity between "mental" and "bodily" states. This is not the place to assess the idea that the mental supervenes on physical, bodily properties. 13 But the idea that naturalism underpins what I am calling exclusively psychological accounts of motivation is important.
Hume himself recognized that the body is "taken for granted in all our reasonings" (Hume 1978, 187) ; our rationality expressed in thoughts and actions presupposes our body understood in physiological terms. But this need not be taken as the only or the primary way that our bodies structure psychological states, rationality, or our meaningful relations with the world more generally. An alternative phenomenological conception would emphasize how the body serves to provide us with a world, it is "that by which there are objects" (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 169; 105) rather than itself merely being an object, the body is that through which things are experienced as meaningful in various ways (e.g. Husserl 1989, 61) . 14 Construing the body as the "medium of perception" in a phenomenological sense offers an alternative conception of how the body is "taken for granted"; it is not just presupposed as the physiological condition of meaningful experience and activity but is more directly involved in the articulation of experience as such. Merleau-Ponty insists, for instance, that an adequate philosophical account of the body cannot be provided in exclusively physiological or "objective" terms, and hence he employs the distinction between the "objective" and the "phenomenal" body (e.g. Merleau-Ponty 2002, 212) , the latter used to refer to "the body that we live by" (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 501) . A phenomenological interpretation emphasizes how our bodily character is directly involved in 13 For an overview of this and related topics see McLaughlin and Bennett (2011) .
14 See Carman (1999) for discussion of the differences between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on the body. I am contrasting a Humean and a phenomenological perspective. However, it is worth
pointing out that what is considered "Humean" has taken on a distinctive meaning in analytic philosophy of mind, one that need not be shared by all readers of Hume. For instance, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty recognized Hume as an early (if not entirely convincing) phenomenologist.
For example, see Merleau-Ponty (2002, 256) . Also, for a phenomenological engagement with
Hume particularly with respect to the body see Todes (2001) .
shaping the meaningful contours of the world in ways that are usually inextricable from experience. The items, features and contexts that we encounter are often meaningful in virtue of what they enable us to do (or prevent us from doing) and how the world solicits (or frustrates) our actions. Recognizing opportunities for action is not just pragmatically helpful for, say, identifying the means by which our desires can be satisfied; the practical nature of being human is a feature of our existence as such, a feature that structures our abilities and inabilities.
But taking seriously a phenomenologically inspired conception of the body does not mean that one ought to deny that the body can be understood "objectively", or that, in a physiological sense, our bodilyness is an incontrovertible aspect of being human. The point is that the role of our bodies cannot be reduced to physiological characteristics, despite those Usually there is a "tacit knowledge or knowing-how of the body" which incorporates the ways in which "our body repertoires, habits, and dispositions" continuously shape our situations (Fuchs 2005a, 97) . In cases of depression, however, this bodily transparency is replaced by forms of opacity. The body becomes a distinctive (and sometimes literally painful) aspect of one"s experience. Thus, in depression:
Instead of being transparent, the body may, as it were, regain its materiality and turn into an obstacle ... a corporealization of the lived body. [In such a case] the relation of the subject to the world is deprived of its immediacy, leading to a fundamental alienation of the self (Fuchs 2005a, 95) .
Alterations to bodily "know-how" and it role in articulating structures of meaning, lead to an alienation of the self which distorts our relation to the world. According to Fuchs depression can involve a fundamental change in body-world relations:
[In depression] the conative dimension of the body, that is, its seeking and striving for satisfaction, is missing. Normally, it is this dimension that opens up the peripersonal space as a realm of possibilities, "affordances", and goals for action. In depressive patients, however, drive, impulse, appetite, and libido are reduced or lost, no more capable of disclosing potential sources of pleasure and satisfaction. As a result, the patient"s imagination, the sense of the possible, fails to generate future goals and plans, leaving the self confined to the present state of pure bodily restriction. Thus the depressive person cannot transcend her body any more ... which is what we normally do when the body serves as the medium for our intentions and actions (Fuchs 2005a, 99) .
Two aspects are important here. Firstly, failures in what are usually considered psychological capacities such as imagination are explained as consequences of changes in bodily openness to the world; an openness that partly constitutes the "realm of possibilities". A depressed person may experience a sense of bodily restriction, a result of a "corporealization", which produces a felt separation of body from the world where the body no longer gives access to the world in the usual ways (Fuchs 2005a, 99) . The second aspect is how the body itself is characterized as having a conative dimension. In the conceptual framework assumed by psychological accounts of motivation conation is closely associated with desires; those states of mind that provide the basic impulse for action and the primary driving force of motivation. In contrast, this alternative view interprets conation as an aspect of our bodily character. Under Fuchs"s interpretation conative attitudes are not simply one style of propositional attitudes in contrast to cognitive propositional attitudes. Conation is not the exclusive responsibility of any kind of mental state at all. Rather, our bodies possess a conative dimension through the ways that our bodies partly constitute how we actively engage meaningfully in the world. In cases where the conative dimension of our bodies is compromised or reduced, as in cases of depression, the correlative structures of meaning, the "realm of possibilities", are affected.
This realm is constituted by a variety of aspects. Part of losing the transparency of the body in Fuchs"s sense is a loss of "emotional resonance" with features in the world and with other people (Fuchs 2005a, 100) . 15 Thus the immediate access to the world which the body usually provides is blocked not only in terms of action-possibilities but also in terms of affectpossibilities. The affective relations with other people and features in the environment become diminished or lost. In melancholic depression, according to Fuchs, people "are no longer capable of being moved and affected by things or persons; the attractive and sympathetic qualities of their surroundings have vanished" (Fuchs 2005a, 100) . The current sense of bodily restriction, then, accounts for changes in the structure of motivation since those things, persons and qualities of surroundings that would otherwise move a person to act are drained of their motivational power. This is not primarily because someone with depression has lost some of their mental states, or that they have additional mental states that block or interfere with others.
Lack of motivation is thus characterized a result of changes to a person"s "bodily resonance" to the world and other people (Fuchs 2005a, 100 15 Such emotional resonance can be understood as wide-scope, involving changes in the structure of interpersonal relations and self-understanding. As Graham puts it: "Depression ... is not just a mood disorder or specific to feeling or affect. It also is a disorder of care and emotional commitment as well as, oftentimes, of self-comprehension" (Graham 2010, 47 Fuchs"s account of corporealization in depression presupposes a broader account of the constitutive role of the body in articulating our meaningful relations to the world some of which can be understood motivational in a sense to be explained in a moment. In the previous section I described the way that a psychological approach to motivation can agree that the body has a constitutive role in our thoughts and actions in so far as psychological states, understood naturalistically, are grounded in our physiological body. Nevertheless, a central principle of the broader account of the body now under consideration, one articulated and defended at length by Merleau-Ponty, is that our bodies are not merely the vehicles through which our inner psychological states are realized in physical form. This is particularly relevant in the present context because, in contrast to accounts which prioritise psychology, changes to motivation can be understood in terms of changes at the level of how our bodies articulate our relation to the world not in terms of changes at the level of mental states.
Merleau-Ponty characterizes our subjectivity and intentionality more widely in terms of motility and practical orientations to the world and what it offers by of possibilities for action (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 158-9) . Consciousness and subjectivity is fundamentally articulated in practical terms; "not a matter of "I think" but of "I can"" (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 159). One"s body constitutes one"s "point of view" on the world central to which are the "intentional threads" that connect the body to our surroundings, and which "attach us to the world" (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 15, 121) . According to Merleau-Ponty the bodily nature of subjectivity is reflected in features of our environment. Our subjectivity is partly constitutive of the world and having a body, as he puts it, is to be "intervovled with a definite environment" (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 94) . One"s body does not simply occupy some spatial location or position; rather, bodily spatiality is one of "situation" where being situated in the relevant sense is shaped by "our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological, and moral situation" (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 115; 157) . 17 As I understand it, situation involves how one is directed towards the world in ways that, quite literally, embody our intentions. Merleau-Ponty rejects the idea that our actions manifest or are guided by our intentions where these are mental representations of states of the world, formulable in propositional terms, with conditions that our actions try to satisfy. Instead, Merleau-Ponty"s view pursues an alternative which emphasizes our inhabitation of the "space of motivations" as Dreyfus puts it (Dreyfus, 2005: 57) . This space supplements the distinction 17 What unites these aspects is an "intentional arc" which in illness ""goes limp"", as he puts it (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 157) .
18 See also Wrathall (2005) .
some philosophers have drawn between the so-called "space of reasons" and "the space of causes" -that is, the space of rational conceptual thought on the one hand and, on the other, the framework of law-like generalities through which we characterize the casual relationships of brute natural matter.
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Merleau-Ponty proposes that we reject the rationalist/empiricist dichotomy which, as he says in a slightly different context, would otherwise force us to treat motivations as either phenomena in the "realm of reasons" or as occurrences in the "realm of causes" (Merleau-Ponty 1974, 105) . 20 The dichotomy prevents our recognizing that a "phenomenological notion of motivation" is available and one that places our bodily openness to the world as central (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 57) . To understand motivation and its pathologies we need to acknowledge the foundational status and role of our bodies and our bodily agency. The space of motivations is a way of characterizing how we are moved by the world, not in some purely mechanistic or purely intellectual sense, but moved by the structures of meanings that reflect our bodily capacities and body-world relations. According to Merleau-Ponty, then, being motivated is not simply a state of mind or some combination of propositional attitudes, neither
is it a state of will or a state of the world as such; rather, "the flow of motivations bear [us] along in the I have characterized the space of motivations as one way that we make things intelligible, specifically the ways that the world moves us to act or fails to. But making intelligible does not just mean bringing to the level of conceptual thought. The space of motivations also refers to the way that objects and states of affairs can motivate whether or not we are aware of them, and whether or not we can, via some deliberative act, come to explicitly conceptualize such motives as "reasons" (Wrathall 2005, 121) . For instance, Merleau-Ponty regards conceptualizing motives as reasons as a form of reduction; to translate into rational thought what constitutes the "flow of motivations" inevitably involves some kind of distortion of the phenomena, and whatever 19 This distinction and the terminology employed to mark it is controversial. For present purposes I will use the space of reasons/space of causes contrast. See Sellars (1997 , 76), McDowell (1996 and Wrathall (2005, 125) . 20 The slightly different context is a discussion of how to characterize the meaning of speech. acting or thinking in a certain way. But, the suggestion is, thinking of motivation in terms of reasons is only one way in which motivations figure in our lives. Merleau-Ponty"s positive claim is that motivation can be understood in terms of body-world reciprocity, a non-conceptual but non-mechanistic meaningful relation between subjectivity and the world. More specifically for the purposes of this paper, it provides a way to develop an alternative to the mentalistic models of motivation that have been thus far dominant.
These considerations suggest that a philosophical account of the relation between the motivating world and subjective responses should respect the range of ways that this relation is I have argued that the motivational relation or reciprocity between self and world is disturbed in forms of depression. In such cases subjectivity may still be structured by essentially practical orientations, although the bodily changes experienced as part of depression articulate that orientation more in terms of "I cannot" rather than "I can". Furthermore, this relationship or reciprocity is one way in which we can appreciate Church"s claim that a phenomenology of depression must take into account the "correspondences" between self and world, the correspondences between what is felt and what is experienced. We are now in a better position
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to see that the relevant correspondences can also refer to relations of motivation understood in terms of our bodily agency. This provides the beginnings of how to understand the ways that motivation is affected in depression without conceding to an account which prioritises psychology. In addition, by emphasizing the nature and role of the phenomenal body in motivation it provides an account that accords directly with first person descriptions of the experience of depression.
Concluding Remarks
Motivation and its pathologies cannot be understood simply by attending to the interplay of psychological states. I have not argued that psychological states are irrelevant or that what I have called the psychological approach is simply misguided as such. The key failure of that approach is a function of not adequately acknowledging the role of the body. As I have explained, the psychological approach might well be supported by a naturalism which can emphasize how the body is important for an account of changes to motivation in depression. My point is that this emphasis is likely to be driven by an exclusively physiological conception of the body, and thus will neglect how the alternative conception I have outlined provides a different and phenomenologically compelling account of motivation. The approach I recommend is not a rejection of the idea that physiological aspects are important in considering motivation and depression, and neither it is a rejection of the idea that psychological states are relevant; but it is rejection of the idea that the body"s role in this context amounts to no more than what can be captured by a physiological characterization and it is a rejection of an exclusively psychological approach to motivation. Considerations about the role of the body in motivation as such, and especially in the experience of depression, suggest that the orthodox psychological approach is inadequate. As outlined in this paper, the received mentalistic accounts do not attend to the constitutive role of the body in how we relate to the world and, in particular, they cannot account for the changes in that relation as they are experienced in depression. In depression, the reciprocity or correspondence between self and world that typically embody motivational relationships fragments. The relevant kinds of motivation and agency cannot be properly understood simply in terms of diminishing mental states or in terms of the undermining effect that some mental states might have with regard to other states. to correct is the assumption that motivation, and thus its pathologies, must be understood in terms of mental states and their relations. So our debates in this context can be advanced by considering the alternative account of motivation which considers the status and role of the body as central to our subjectivity and to core features of the experience of depression. 21 
